The Bystander Effect
Why senior teams sometimes make decisions that are clearly wrong
The term “Bystander effect” was coined by psychologists John M. Darley and Bibb Latané in 1968, four years after the murder of Kitty Genovese in New York City, which was observed by over 30 people, none of whom called for help as Genovese was seen screaming while being attacked. Darley and Latané conducted a series of experiments, including having their subjects complete a questionnaire in a room that was slowly filling with smoke with and without others present. When alone, subjects quickly called for help. When in a room with others who were experimental confederates who ignored the smoke, the subjects rarely took action. The Genovese incident and the subsequent experiments were taken to indicate two points. First, when others are present, responsibility becomes diffused. Second, due to social pressure and the fear of making a mistake, when others support a decision that a person disagrees with, they are likely to go along with the decision rather than challenge it.
Today, we see possible instances of the bystander effect taking place in Congress and among countries on a global scale. There is no evidence to suggest that corporate leaders are somehow immune. What are the implications for the C-Suite?
First, leaders should recognize that the bystander effect is powerful. If elected officials and world leaders can be infected by it, so can we. Therefore, we shouldn’t assume that we have consensus just because no one disagrees openly with our ideas. We may think we have consensus among willing followers when we don’t. The size of the bystander effect is proportional to the power of the leader relative to the group and the number of people present. When the president of the United States speaks, it can appear that a room full of elected representatives of the president’s party are ready to follow along in lockstep. In fact, it may be that the majority of those assembled are waiting for someone else to make the first objection. Likewise, when a CEO speaks, especially to an assembled team or large gathering, there is no way to know what those assembled are really thinking. Even polling people individually may not provide accurate insights, as the experimental research demonstrated.
If a CEO can’t trust his or her team to provide honest feedback, what’s to be done? One option is for the CEO to leave the room; this simple act will relieve the hierarchical pressure and signal that the CEO really wants to know what people think. However, this tactic might not work as the ephemeral presence of the CEO remains in the pursuing conversation. Members of the team know, or at least think they know, what the CEO wants them to say. Even if not present, the will of the CEO will color people’s thinking.
The CEO could also request that the team come up with a counter-alternative to his or her preferred solution. The team will dutifully comply, but the alternative will rarely be adopted.
The CEO could refer the matter to an external, unbiased group, but following that, the external group’s recommendation still would come back to the CEO and team for discussion. The same pressures as before would remain. As an illustration, any number of decisions made by the current president of the United States that have hurt his numbers in the polls have been challenged by the opposition party and the press, but only a handful of decisions have been reversed.
To reiterate, a key finding from the research on the bystander effect is that individuals go along with others because they fear making a mistake. But it’s even a bit worse than that. In the 1950s, Solomon Asch conducted his famous conformity experiments in which subjects were shown lines of different lengths and asked to state which was longest. Despite the correct answer being obvious, many subjects went along with experimental confederates who chose the wrong answer. It wasn’t just that people feared making a mistake; they knowingly made mistakes to avoid the discomfort of being at odds with their peers.
When we combine the results of the bystander research with those from the conformity studies, we are left with a frightening picture of team dynamics, captured by Irving Janus in 1972 in his famous article on groupthink, which examined failed policy decisions. The eight symptoms of groupthink he called out were the following:
· Holding an illusion of invulnerability (we can’t lose!)
· Collective rationalization (coming up with an explanation to silence critics)
· Belief in one’s morality (our critics are evil, we are just)
· Stereotyping outgroups (our competitors are inept)
· Direct pressure on dissenters (peer pressure)
· Self-censorship (I go along despite my doubts)
· Illusion of unanimity (It seems we all agree)
· Mindguards (data that don’t support our position are downplayed)
We can see all of these factors in play in some recent policy decisions, and we should therefore accept that if groupthink can affect the most important decisions at the highest levels, we are not exempt from its influence.
While there are no guaranteed cures for the bystander effect, conformity pressures or groupthink, there is a glimmer of hope. In research into these topics by a number of researchers, it only takes one brave soul speaking up to break the dam. Witnessing another individual jump into action or disagree with the boss is all that is required for others to follow suit. Witnesses to the murder of Kitty Genovese felt remorse for failing to take actions that could have saved her. Years later, policy makers often admit they were pressured into supporting poor decisions. If team members give thought to the mess they will be dealing with later by going along with a bad decision today, they might be more inclined to speak up.
As a leader, the more people respect and look up to you, the greater the danger of inaction or false agreement on the part of your team. Leaders who display genuine humility understand that by making themselves vulnerable, they open the door for others to display heroism.

